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DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION*
BY JOHN E. WALSH, JR.** AND DAVID M. JONES***
INTRODUCTION: THE REGISTER OF WILLS
The Register of Wills is an elected official in each of the sixty-seven
counties of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His jurisdiction and duties
are prescribed in various Acts of the Legislature, notably The Fiduciaries
Act of 1949,1 The Register of Wills Act of 1951,2 and The Orphan's Court
Act of 1951.3 The Register's jurisdiction and the scope of his duties emanate
primarily from these acts, although they have been the subject of extensive
construction and delineation by the orphans' courts of the various counties
and by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
The essentially statutory nature of the Register's functions has created
-not only for the public, but also for the Bar-a general impression that the
Register is a purely administrative official. In many respects, it is correctly
observed that the Register performs in a primarily administrative capacity;
however, it is also true that he performs significant quasi-judicial functions.
Prior to the enactment of the Register of Wills Act of 1951, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania held, with sufficient frequency and clarity that there
could be no doubt as to the import of its words, that the Register of Wills, as
to matters concerning probate, was a judge whose decisions were unimpeach-
able except on appeal.4 This classic view has been reaffirmed in decisions
handed down subsequent to the enactment of The Register of Wills Act.5 The
judicial character of the functions performed by the Register is limited,
however, to the extent that he has been granted jurisdiction over matters of
probate only. His jurisdiction in this area, it should be remembered, is ex-
clusive 0 -just as the authority to determine questions concerning distribution
* This is the third in a series of articles describing and evaluating the jurisdiction
and functions of the Register of Wills in Pennsylvania. The first article in the series,
entitled Lost Wills and the Register of Wills, appears in 111 U. PA. L. REv. 450 (1963)
the second, Copy Fair, appears in 36 TEMP. L.Q.-(1963).
** Register of Wills and Clerk of Orphans' Court, City of Philadelphia; B.S.,
1933, U.S. Naval Academy; LL.B., 1936, University of Pennsylvania Law School;
member, Pennsylvania and New York Bars; senior associate of the law firm of White
and Williams.
*** LL.B., 1962, University of Pennsylvania Law School; member, Pennsylvania
Bar; associate of the law firm of MacCoy, Evans & Lewis.
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 320.101-.1401 (1950), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, §§ 320.102-.1102 (Supp. 1962).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 1840.101-.601 (Supp. 1962).
3. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 2080.101-.801 (Supp. 1962).
4. Szmahl's Estate, 335 Pa. 89, 6 A.2d 267 (1939) ; West v. Young, 332 Pa. 248,
2 A.2d 745 (1938) ; Sebik's Estate, 300 Pa. 45, 150 At. 101 (1930) ; McNichol's
Estate, 282 Pa. 187, 127 At. 461 (1925).
5. Lennox v. Clark, 372 Pa. 355, 372, 93 A.2d 834, 842 (1953) ; Mangold v. Neuman,
371 Pa. 496, 498, 91 A.2d 904, 905 (1952).
6. Martin Estate, 349 Pa. 255, 36 A.2d 786 (1944).
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in the administration of decedents' estates is vested exclusively in the
orphans' court.7 This Article concerns itself with one of those areas in
which the function of the Register of Wills as a "judge" is the dominant
factor: the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation in
the preparation of the copy fair.
Copy FAIR
The order of the Register by which a will is admitted to probate has
the force and effect of a judicial decree.8 As a practical matter, when con-
fronted with a will on which there are one or more unsigned additions,
alterations, deletions, insertions, interlineations, notations or substitutions,
the Register's decree of probate must distinguish that which he holds to be
admissible to probate from that which is not. This is accomplished by the
Register's making a physical copy of the document proferred including only
that writing which he holds to be entitled to probate as the decedent's last
will and testament. This may be effectuated with hearing or without, de-
pending generally upon the nature of the unsigned marking, and upon the
severity and substance of the dispute centered around it. Thus, the copy
fair is, in its final state, a "fair copy" of so much of the decedent's will as
the Register deems to be entitled to probate.
This Article will discuss in detail the situation where the testator has
made an alteration, or a cancellation with an interlineation, or another
writing which in and of itself is sufficient to operate as a revocation of the
gift affected, and where the testator has at the same time attempted a
substitutionary gift affecting either the same persons or property, which
substitutionary gift is not valid because of a defect in its creation or because
of the existence of circumstances beyond the testator's knowledge or control.
In this context, the questions which initially confront the Register of
Wills, when the testamentary writing is offered for probate, are: (1) Was
the original gift effectively revoked? (2) If so, is the substitutionary gift
valid? (3) If not, does the invalidity of the later gift render inoperative the
revocation of the original gift? These questions are necessarily preliminary
to the ultimate question for the Register, which is: what shall be admitted to
probate? The determination of this question will depend upon whether or not
the doctrine of dependent relative revocation is applicable under the particular
set of facts presented. The impact which the acts of revocation and substitu-
tion have on the determination of the testator's dispositive intent and upon
the property and beneficiaries affected imports an obvious necessity that the
7. Rockett Will, 348 Pa. 445, 35 A.2d 303 (1944) ; Carson's Estate, 241 Pa. 117,
88 Atl. 311 (1913); Hegarty's Appeal, 75 Pa. 503 (1874).
8. Authorities cited and text accompanying notes 6 and 7 supra.
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Register of Wills should have a clear and complete understanding of the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation and of the circumstances in which
it applies.
DEPENDENT RELATIVE REVOCATION DEFINED
The doctrine of dependent relative revocation and the requirements of the
rule have been stated generally as follows:
Where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another
will, so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the
revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new disposi-
tion intended to be substituted, such will be the legal effect of the
transaction; and therefore, if the will intended to be substituted is
inoperative from defect of attestation, or any other cause, the revoca-
tion fails also, and the original will remains in force . .. .9
It will be shown that Pennsylvania courts have refused to adopt the
doctrine without qualification; several important restrictions have been
grafted upon its application. 10 These restrictions and their efficacy shall
be treated in full.
WHERE THE DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY
Initially, it should be observed that circumstances may arise where a
cursory view of the fact situation seems to dictate the determination of the
problem through the medium of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation,
but where a closer scrutiny of the facts will disclose that the doctrine
properly has no application whatever. These circumstances should be noted
with some care in order that an early appreciation may be realized of the
rather limited-indeed isolated-area in which the doctrine has been permit-
ted to operate in Pennsylvania.
The effective revocation of a testamentary gift must be predicated upon
capacity and intent." Therefore, where the testator executes a revoking
9. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 275, 56 A.2d 201, 203 (1948), quoting 1 JARMAN,
WILLS 135 (7th ed. 1930). It will soon be observed, however, that the doctrine also
embraces changes made by codicil and interlineation; it is not limited to changes made by
will as is suggested.
10. See Holt Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 174 A.2d 874 (1961) ; McClure's Estate, 309 Pa.
370, 165 Ati. 24 (1933) ; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857).
11. The Wills Act of 1947, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950), provides as
follows:
No will or codicil in writing, or any part thereof, can be revoked or
altered otherwise than:
(1) Will or Codicil. By some other will or codicil in writing,
(2) Other Writing. By some other writing declaring the same, executed and
proved in the manner required of wills, or
(3) Act to the Document. By being burnt, torn, cancelled, obliterated, or
destroyed, with the intent and for the purpose of revocation by the testator
himself or by another person in his presence and by his express direction. If
1963]
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instrument while under a mental or other incapacity, the original gift remains
unrevoked. This result obtains, not by reason of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation, but because the purported revoking instrument is itself
not valid in light of the testator's lack of requisite capacity and intent to
execute it and to vest it with validity; that is, it is not a question of reviving
an original and revoked gift because the original gift is never revoked at
all. 12 Similarly, where the substitutionary gift is the product of undue
influence and is therefore invalid, the original gift is never effectively re-
voked; its vitality, although seemingly stemming from reinstatement, has
in fact never really been interrupted. 1 Under the same' rationale, it appears
that where the ostensible revocation of the original instrument occurs through
inadvertence and without intent to revoke (e.g., accidental destruction),
there is no effective revocation of the instrument. 14 The foregoing discussion
is intended to demonstrate the inapplicability of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation where the attempted revocation of the original gift was
ineffectual ab initio.
It is also to be observed that dependent relative revocation has in most
jurisdictions1 5 no applicability where the revoking instrument has been lost.
The general rule is that a lost will may be proved, 1 although this is not true
where the sole purpose of such proof is to establish the revocation of an
earlier will.' 7 Thus, where the revoking instrument has been lost, the first
will remains operative, not by reason of dependent relative revocation, but
because its revocation is not susceptible of being proved.
REVOCATION AND SUBSTITUTION
Unless the testator possesses the capacity and intent to revoke an earlier
gift, the doctrine of dependent relative revocation has no applicability, re-
such act is done by any person other than the testator, the direction of the
testator must be proved by the oaths or affirmations of two competent witnesses.
See Kapp's Estate, 317 Pa. 253, 176 Atl. 501 (1935).
Note that revocation by the doing of an act to the document requires specific
intent. Revocation by will or codicil or by another writing requires capacity to execute
such an instrument in accordance with the provisions of § 1 of the act (PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20, § 180.1 (Supp. 1962)) which provides in part:
(a) Persons Twenty-one or Older. Any person of sound mind twenty-one
years of age or older may by will dispose of all his real and personal estate
12. See BREGY, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES ACT OF 1947, at 2369 (1949).
13. Rudy v. Ulrich, 69 Pa. 177 (1871). The same problem was raised and discussed
in Ash Will, 351 Pa. 317, 41 A.2d 620 (1945).
14. See BREGY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 2355, 2375-76, and cases therein cited.
15. 57 AM. JUR. Wills § 518 (1948) and cases therein cited.
16. See Walsh, Lost Wills and the Register of Wills, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 450
(1963).
17. Id. at 456. See Koehler's Estate, 316 Pa. 321, 175 Atl. 424 (1934); Shetter's
Estate, 303 Pa. 193, 154 Atl. 288 (1931).
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gardless of other circumstances, including later testamentary provisions.
The requirement for an animus revocandi is absolute. Further, the doctrine
applies only where an effective revocation is coupled with a substitutionary
gift which is, in fact, provided for; where a substitutionary gift is only
intended, but is in fact never made, a clear revocation of the orginal gift is
given effect, and that gift will, under no circumstances, be reinstated.' In
addition to the elements of intentional revocation and substitution already
mentioned, it must be made to appear that the testator intended the revoca-
tion of the original gift only if the substituted gift were effective. 19 Therefore,
in order that the doctrine should come into consideration at all, it must be
determined that the testator would not have revoked the earlier gift had he
known that the substituted gift was invalid, that is, that revocation was not
to be operative independently of these other circumstances. 20 The issue, then,
is clearly one of intent, and the solution is one of construction.
21
In summary, the application of the doctrine of dependent relative rev-
ocation may be said to rest upon two requirements: (1) that testator,
possessing the capacity so to do, intentionally revokes a testamentary gift
and, with the same capacity and intent, creates a gift which is to be substituted
for the one revoked; and (2) that testator intends the revocation of the
original gift to be dependent upon the validity of the substitutionary gift,
which gift contrary to his wishes is invalid.
22
It has been stated that the determination of the testator's intent is a
matter of construction. The instance in which the construction of his intent
is most favorable to the application of the doctrine is where the revocation and
the substitutionary gift are made concurrently, as, for example, where both
are provided for in the same codicil. 23 Nevertheless, the mere concurrence of
revocation and substitution is not conclusive; it must still be shown that the
effectiveness of the former was intended to depend upon the validity of the
latter.24 This determination is to be based upon an evaluation of the writings
18. Holt Estate, supra note 10; Emernecker's Estate, 218 Pa. 369, 67 Atl. 701
(1907) ; Heller Estate, 158 Pa. Super. 194, 44 A.2d 528 (1945).
19. Braun Estate, supra note 9; McDermott's Estate, I Pa. D. & C. 789 (Orphans'
Ct. 1922): Lutz's Estate, 9 Pa. County Ct. 294, 27 W.N.C. 403 (Orphans' Ct. 1890).
20. See AKER, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION OF WILLS § 3.14M (1962); but see
Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679 (1914) ; Swanson Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 358
(Orphans' Ct. 1950).
21. Ibid. See Hartman's Estate (No. 1), 320 Pa. 321, 182 Atl. 234 (1936) ; Baugh's
Estate, 288 Pa. 308, 136 Atl. 210 (1927) ; Teacle's Estate, 153 Pa. 219, 25 Atl. 135
(1893).
22. See SuMM. PA. JUR. Intestacy and Wills § 259 (1956).
23. Braun Estate, supra note 9; Worrell's Estate, 11 Pa. D- & C. 364 (Orphans' Ct.
1928).
24. See authorities cited and text accompanying notes 19 and 20 supra.
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involved, 25 the relationship between the affected gifts, 26 a determination of
testator's over-all testamentary scheme,
27 and other pertinent circumstances.2 8
Braun Estate29 is an excellent example of the manner in which the
supreme court has approached the determination of the testator's intent.
In that case, testator's will, executed when his adopted daughter was fifteen
years of age, bequeathed the sum of fifty thousand dollars to trustees for
her benefit, the entire corpus to be paid over to her at age thirty-five. By
subsequent holographic codicil, testator provided: "I hereby revoke the
Trust Fund in favor of my Daughter, Mildred, and substitute a lump sum of
dollars in cash." The residuary legatee contended that the
provisions of the codicil constituted an unqualified revocation of the
daughter's legacy and that the substitutionary gift was void for uncertainty.
The auditing judge disagreed and awarded the fund outright to the daughter
who had then passed the age of thirty-five. His decision was grounded upon
a finding that the revocation of the trust was conditional upon the validity
of the substituted gift. The supreme court, affirming, observed that the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation, although not adopted in its
arbitrary form in Pennsylvania, 30 had never been forbidden by the authori-
ties.31 The court, after construing the will and the codicil together, concluded
that testator nowhere indicated "that his daughter was to cease being an
object of his testamentary bounty."3 2 The following circumstances of the
case were carefully considered: the daughter's age at the time of execution
of the original instrument; her age at the time of the execution of the
codicil; the language of the codicil which, but for the missing figure, clearly
manifested an intent to give her some amount of money; and testator's
natural desire to provide for an adopted child. These considerations led the
court to conclude that testator's intent was to provide a substitutionary gift
and not an unconditional revocation.
As yet, there has not been developed a definitive body of evidentiary
rules peculiar to the context in which the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation operates. This is unquestionably due to the absence of a require-
ment for specialized rules in view of the reluctance with which the courts have
25. Ibid. Compare Braun Estate, supra note 9, with Heller Estate, supra note 18.
26. See authorities cited and text accompanying notes 19 and 20 supra; Teacle's
Estate, supra note 21.
27. An incomplete, ambiguous or equivocal direction which purportedly modifies a
will cannot be used to defeat its general scheme, Baugh's Estate, supra note 21.
28. See, e.g., Braun Estate, supra note 9 (family relationship between testator and
disappointed beneficiary) ; Melville's Estate, supra note 20 (substituted legacy made to
a charity within 30 days of death).
29. Supra note 9.
30. Citing McClure's Estate, supra note 10.
31. Braun Estate, supra note 9, at 273-74, 56 A.2d at 202.
32. Id. at 276, 56 A.2d at 203.
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applied the doctrine. It appears that almost any pertinent evidence which will
shed light on testator's intent will be admitted.3 3 In fact, in Braun Estate
the court engaged in an admittedly speculative venture with reference to
testator's intent, at least for the sake of argumentative inference if not for
evidentiary reasonsY
4
The means which the testator selects to effect the revocation of the
original gift seem to be immaterial,35 although it would seem that compliance
with the applicable provisions of the Wills Act would necessarily be
required.
3 6
THE FAILURE OF THE SUBSTITUTIONARY GIFT
The discussion to this point has dealt primarily with the necessity of
there being an effective revocation of a testamentary gift together with an
ineffectual provision for a substitutionary gift. It next becomes necessary to
study this substitutionary gift and to determine the extent to which its nature
affects the application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. A
substitutionary gift may fail for any number of reasons,37 for example, want
of execution in accordance with the provisions of the Wills Act,38 incapacity
of the beneficiary to take the gift,39 ambiguity or incompleteness, 40 death of
the testator within thirty days of making a charitable gift,41 or violation of
the rule against perpetuities.
4 2
In Pennsylvania it is very clear that the applicability of the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation depends upon the reason for the failure of the
substitutionary gift. The rule is that where that failure is attributable to a
defect intrinsic to the instrument or to its execution, the revoked gift may be
reinstated by application of the doctrine of dependent relative revocation.
Where, however, that failure is attributable to circumstances extrinsic to the
testamentary writing, the revocation of the original gift stands and the
doctrine will not be applied. 43 It is quite apparent from the cases that the
33. AKER, op. cit. supra note 20, § 3.14M.
34. Supra note 9, at 277, 56 A.2d at 204.
35. AKER, op. cit. supra note 20, § 3.14M; SUMM. PA. JUR. Intestacy and Wills
§ 262 (1956).
36. See note 11 supra.
37. See generally Walsh, Copy Fair, 36 TEMP. L.Q.-(1963).
38. E.g, Wright Estate, 380 Pa. 106, 110 A.2d 198 (1955) ; McClure's Estate,
supra note 10; Ducommun Estate, 2 Fiduc. Rep. 69 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1951).
39. E.g., Price v. Maxwell, supra note 10.
40. E.g., Braun Estate, supra note 9.
41. E.g., Hartmflan's Estate (No. I), supra note 21; Price v. Maxwell, supra note
10.
42. E.g., Stevenson's Estate, 48 Pa. D. & C. 140 (Orphans' Ct. 1943); Rice's
Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 123 (Orphans' Ct. 1929).
43. Braun Estate, supra note 9; Worrell's Estate, supra note 23; cf. Hartman's




origin of this distinction lay in cases concerning the invalidity of charitable
gifts made within thirty days of death, 44 which invalidity results from
statute and is therefore extrinsic. The perpetuation of this distinction hardly
seems justified since the enactment of the Wills Act of 1947,4 5 wherein it
is provided that substituted charitable gifts shall be valid to the extent that
they were valid in the original testamentary writing, notwithstanding
death within thirty days.46 In other words, the vitality of the distinction has.
been weakened by statute with regard to charitable gifts, while it apparently
subsists in the area of non-charitable gifts ;47 at least there appears to be no
authority indicating that the contrary is true.
CHANGES IN THE WILL PROPER
Another aspect of the application of the doctrine is the manner in which
the revocation and substitution are made. For example, where the testator
cancels the name of the executor or of a beneficiary in his will, the revocation
is operative even though the interlined substitutionary appointment is invalid
for lack of execution. 48 The reasoning behind the refusal to apply dependent
relative revocation in such cases is logical; where testator cancels an executor
or beneficiary in favor of a substituted appointee, it is fairly clear that his
act arose as much out of a desire to remove the former as it did out of a
desire to favor the latter.49 This distinction, like others in this area, can be
carried to unwarranted extremes. For example, in Swanson Estate ° tes-
tator's brother predeceased him, after testator had executed his will; testator
canceled out his brother's name and inserted in lieu thereof the name of the
brother's son by ineffectual interlineation. Notwithstanding the son would,
absent testator's abortive attempt to substitute his name, have shared in the
gift under the provisions of the Wills Act,51 the court did not apply the
doctrine of dependent relative revocation, but held both gifts to be ineffectual.
It does not appear from the report of the case or in commentary thereon
5 2
that the doctrine was argued in that case. Had it been urged, however, the
44. See, e.g., Hartman's Estate (No. 1), supra note 21; Price v. Maxwell, supra
note 10.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 180.1-.22 (1950), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20,
§§ 180.1-.23 (Supp. 1962).
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) (1950).
47. For examples of the application of the distinction to noncharitable gifts see
Mendinhall's Appeal, 124 Pa. 387, 16 Atl. 881 (1889) ; and McCalla's Estate, 33 Pa.
D. & C. 643 (Orphans' Ct. 1938).
48. Swanson Estate, supra note 20 (beneficiary canceled); Ducommun Estate,
supra note 38 (beneficiary canceled); Cromer Estate, 69 Pa. D. & C. 81 (Orphans'
Ct. 1949) (executor canceled) ; see Walsh, supra note 37, at -.
49. See BREGY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 2370.
50. Supra note 20.
51. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(8) (1950).
52. 13 U. Prrr. L. REv. 440 (1952).
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result may have been the same under the rationale of the distinction presently
being considered; on the other hand, the defect in the substitutionary gift was
intrinsic to the instrument (lack of execution), so that there existed a clear
opportunity for application of the doctrine. It seems to be firmly established
in Pennsylvania that, where an attempt is made to substitute a beneficiary by
interlineation, the gift to the canceled beneficiary cannot be reinstated; the
identity of the substituted beneficiary is immaterial. 53
Where the alteration or interlineation purports to change the amount of
a cash legacy rather than the identity of the beneficiary, a different approach
is employed by the courts. The distinction is not without merit in logic and
involves different considerations depending upon whether the amount of the
legacy is increased or decreased. 54 Where the legacy is increased in the manner
described, it has been held that the original gift is valid, the theory being that
the ineffectual attempt to increase it is the very antithesis of an intent to
revoke the earlier gift.55 Although such interlineation is not itself valid,
because it is in the nature of a codicil, it is nevertheless admissible as
evidence of testator's intent.5 6 On the other hand, where testator has by
ineffectual interlineation decreased the amount of a legacy, it cannot be argued
that there was no intent to revoke the gift, at least pro tanto. The question
is whether the legatee takes anything at all. There is dictum to the effect
that both the cancellation and the interlineation should be disregarded and
that the original gift be left unaffected.5 7 Logic would seem to dictate that
the original gift should be admitted as evidence of the extent to which
testator intended it to be modified.
5 8
Finally, in the context of cancellations coupled with interlineations there
should be considered the situation in which the testator substitutes, instead
of a beneficiary or the size of a legacy, the gift itself. McCalla's Estate,"9
involving a fact situation not precisely in point, was nevertheless somewhat
analogous. Testatrix by codicil had revoked a legacy because she had
made an inter vivos gift to the same beneficiary; this gift was subsequently
voided on the grounds of undue influence in its procurement, but the legatee
was unsuccessful in urging the application of the doctrine of dependent
relative revocation to save the original bequest. The court determined that
testatrix had revoked the earlier gift because of a mistaken belief that a
53. Melville's Estate, supra note 20.
54. SuMM. PA. JUR. Intestacy and Wills §§ 265-66 (1956).
55. Okowitz Will, 403 Pa. 82, 169 A.2d 84 (1961) (amount expressed in terms of
percentage of residue) ; Rife Estate, 88 Pa. D. & C. 360 (Orphans' Ct. 1954) (amount
of cash specified).
56. Okowitz Will, supra; Rife Estate, supra.
57. Dixon's Appeal, 55 Pa. 424 (1867).
58. See BREGY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 2377-78.
59. Supra note 47.
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valid inter vivos gift had been made, but decided the case on authority dealing
with extrinsic defects, 0 indicating that revocation was effected under a
mistake which was within testatrix' knowledge. It was not made clear and,
in the opinion of this Register, it should have been made clear at the time
of probate of the testatrix' will whether the undue influence which prompted
the inter vivos gift was also exerted at the time when the original will was
made (although the determination would not have affected the result in this
case). The hypothetical case suggested-substitution of a gift by interlineation
-has not been squarely presented; it is clear, however, that the doctrine of
dependent relative revocation will not be applied where the substitution was
due to a collateral mistake of fact under circumstances within the testator's
knowledge or control. There is dictum to the effect that the revocation may be
set aside where the mistake, even though collateral, was not within testator's
knowledge.61
CHANGES MADE BY CODICIL
Where testator provides for revocation of an earlier gift by codicil while
providing therein for a substitutionary gift which is defective, the question
is: should the revoking clause be given effect independently of the abortive
disposition? Under the provisions of the Wills Act the revocation would,
but for the doctrine of dependent relative revocation, be effective and
operative. 2 The question appears to be one of applicability of the doctrine,
that is, whether the revocation was intended in any event or only if the
substitutionary gift were valid. The considerations which govern this
determination have been discussed in detail heretofore. It should be noted,
however, that the distinction between dispositions which fail because of
intrinsic or extrinsic defects is carefully maintained.
63
Where testator has provided for the same beneficiary in the codicil,
there seems to be a tendency of courts to overlook or explain away a clause
revoking the earlier gift without facing the real legal problem and alluding to
the doctrine.6 4 This is true whether the attempted substitutionary gift fails
by reason of ambiguity, incompleteness,65 or invalidity. 66 On the other hand,
a complete change of beneficiary will cause the revocation to stand despite
60. McClure's Estate, supra note 10; Melville's Estate, supra note 20; Mendinhall's
Appeal, supra note 47.
61. Mendinhall's Appeal, supra note 47; McCalla's Estate, supra note 47; Cummins'
Estate, 37 Pa. Super. 580 (1908).
62. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.5(1) (1950). See note 11 supra.
63. See, e.g., Melville's Estate, supra note 20.
64. See Morrow's Estate (No. 2), 204 Pa. 484, 54 At. 342 (1903) ; Sloan's Appeal,
168 Pa. 422, 32 At. 42 (1895) ; cf. Braun Estate, 358 Pa. 271, 56 A.2d 201 (1948).
65. See Braun Estate, supra.
66. Stevenson's Estate, supra note 42; Rice's Estate, suPra note 42 (rule against
perpetuities violated) ; Lutz's Estate, supra note 19 (rule against accumulations violated).
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the invalidity of the later gift,61 except where testator has stated in the
document that the revocation is dependent upon the validity of the substituted
gift.68
CHANGES MADE BY NEW WILL
It seems that where substitutionary gifts are made in a new but defective
will, as opposed to codicil or interlineation, the doctrine of dependent relative
revocation has no applicability and the revocation of the first will stands.6 9
This is certainly true where a complete change of beneficiaries is attempted.70
This also seems to be the rule where the beneficiary is the same but the
amount of the gift is changed. 7 The most plausible rationale for the rule
may be that testator could make no more dramatic or conclusive expression
of an intent to revise his testamentary scheme than through the preparation of
a new will.
Whether an instrument is a will or a codicil presents another question.
Where an instrument called a will preserves certain gifts in an earlier
instrument by reference to them, it is given the effect of a codicil and is
governed by the rules pertaining to codicils,7 2 but this is not so where the
provisions of the earlier will are repeated.7 3 It should be remembered, however,
that the foregoing has no application where the second will is void for lack
of capacity or intent on the part of the testator, because in such case the
first will was never effectively revoked.
7 4
CRITICISMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It has been seen that the doctrine of dependent relative revocation has
only a limited application in Pennsylvania. To an extent, the reason is
plausible: "[I]t usually [furnishes] . . . only speculation or a wild guess
as to testator's intention to make his absolute revocation merely condi-
tional. '75 This, of course, is partially true; but it has always been a primary
objective of the law to honor the testator's intentions.7 6 Therefore, with
testator's wishes being foremost, it seems unjust to refuse to inquire into
67. Melville's Estate, supra note 20.
68. McDermott's Estate; supra note 19.
69. BREGX, INTESTATE, WILLS AND ESTATES AcT OF 1947, at 2371, 2373 (1949).
70. McClure's Estate, 309 Pa. 370, 165 Atl. 24 (1933).
71. Hartman's Estate (No. 1), supra note 21; notice, however, that this case
involved a charitable gift attempted within 30 days of death prior to the enactment of the
liberalized provisions of section 7(1) of the Wills Act of 1947 (PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
20, § 180.7(1) (1950)).
72. Bingaman's Estate, 281 Pa. 497, 127 Atl. 73 (1924).
73. Hartman's Estate (No. 1), 320 Pa. 321, 182 At. 234 (1936).
74. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
75. Holt Estate, 405 Pa. 244, 250-51, 174 A.2d 874, 877 (1961).
76. See, e.g., Wright Estate, supra note 38, referring to testator's intent as the
"pole star" of construction.
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them when a substitutionary gift fails. The doctrine of dependent relative
revocation, if judiciously applied, could serve as a most effective expediter
of testator's wishes. Indeed, many of the reasons given for refusing to apply
the doctrine in the past have become strained 77 or anachronistic. 78
In Pennsylvania, once the problem of animus revocandi has been resolved,
the Register of Wills who is confronted with altered or conflicting instruments
must begin to evaluate an assortment of causes for the failure of the
substitutionary gift. Whether this is due to intrinsic or extrinsic causes
seems to make less practical difference, insofar as many of the reported cases
are concerned, since the enactment of the Wills Act of 1947 which validates
certain charitable gifts made within thirty days of death.
79
The rule which refuses to reinstate revoked gifts where the beneficiary
has been changed is basically sound. Such a gift should not be given new life
where it appears that the revocation would have been made regardless of
the validity of the second gift. The rule has been strained, however, in
Swanson Estate0 which is a perfect example of the injustice which can
result from inflexible application of a principle and which flies in the very
teeth of reason.
The distinction which is recognized between legacies increased and
decreased in amount by substitution should be emphasized. The rule pertain-
ing to increases in the amount of legacies would ignore both the revocation and
the new invalid gift. This is logical because of a clear absence of animus
revocandi. But this does not hold true in the case of a decrease; there it would
seem that the new amount should be given effect, with the earlier gift serving
as evidence of the extent of the revocation intended. In this case it is clear
that testator acted in animo revocandi, and it would be a clear violation of
his intent to disregard both the revocation and the substitutionary gift.8'
Finally, there seems to be no good reason why there should any longer be
maintained a distinction between the various vehicles used to accomplish the
revocation and substitution, that is, interlineation, codicil or later will. The
distinction seems to be extremely artificial in light of the avowed end of the
law to give effect to testator's intent.
Ultimately the matter is one of construction. It would seem to this
Register that the remedy of appeal would provide a safeguard against
abuse, should the doctrine of dependent relative revocation be adopted in
77. See, e.g., Swanson Estate, 74 Pa. D. & C. 358 (Orphans' Ct. 1950).
78. See, e.g., Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. 23 (1857), in the matter of charitable gifts
made within 30 days of death.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.7(1) (1950) ; AKER, PROBATE AND INTERPRETATION
OF WILLS § 3.14M (1962) ; see text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
80. Supra note 77.
81. See BREGY, op. cit. supra note 69, at 2377-78.
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Pennsylvania to the full extent of its generally accepted definition. In fact,
a more simplified rule, such as that suggested by Jarman,82 would assure a
more just application; and the removal of strained, artificial and anachro-
nistic distinctions would give the register, who may find the present battery of
rules and distinctions more confusing than helpful, a more modern and flexible
tool with which to work toward the result which the testator himself in-
tended. In any event, a consideration of this problem should urge the
Registers in this Commonwealth to hold full and complete hearings to
determine to the best of their ability the actual intent of the testator.
82. Text accompanying note 9 supra. As applied, of course, this statement of the
rule has been expanded to include dispositions by codicil or by cancellation and inter-
lineation.

